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Pnina Lahav
A Small Nation Goes to War:  
Israel’s Cabinet Authorization of the 
1956 War
AbStrACt
The Suez War had long term ramifications for Israel’s status in the Middle 
East and for its relations with the U.S., Europe, and the USSr. This article 
is a first segment in the examination of the interplay between military and 
diplomatic means deployed by Israel in its quest to consolidate the gains 
of the 1948 war and secure its sovereignty. It provides a detailed analysis of 
the Israeli cabinet deliberations as it reached the decision to authorize war. 
The article examines the cabinet’s opinions on the language of the motion 
to go to war, the list of casus belli offered, the secret agreement with France 
and britain which precipitated the war, considerations of possible compli-
cations, the theory of war and peace, the likelihood of regime change in 
Egypt, and the preparedness of the home front. It raises the question of the 
relevance of the comparative size and strength of a nation as it ponders the 
option of launching a war.
bACKGrOUND
On 29 October 1956, Israel launched a war against Egypt. 
two days later it became clear that britain and France were Israel’s senior 
partners, and that the central target of the two colonial powers was to 
restore their hold over the Suez Canal.1 A fearsome international storm 
erupted and the three belligerents quickly abandoned their grand plan and 
withdrew their forces. While short and militarily uneventful, the Suez War 
is generally considered a watershed event in the history of Middle East. It 
signaled the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the transformation 
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of the region into a battleground between the U.S. and the USSr; thereby, 
the Arab–Israeli conflict intensified in ways hitherto unpredicted. The Suez 
War was also etched in the minds of Israel’s decision makers and affected 
their decision making a decade later during the Six-Day War and, later, 
the Yom Kippur War. Its further significance lies in the fact that this was 
the first time Israel’s cabinet approved a war since the establishment of the 
state in 1948.
Until recently, the voluminous scholarship on this war did not pay 
much attention to the Israeli cabinet deliberations authorizing the war. 
The perceived wisdom was that the ministers were privately informed by 
PM and Minister of Defense ben-Gurion, and that the formal process of 
authorization was trivial.2 One reason for this assertion was that the cabinet 
protocols were classified and inaccessible; however, in 2008, the files were 
opened.3
The protocols reveal that even though the cabinet was aware that it 
was facing a fait accomplis it still deliberated vigorously and for the most 
part honestly and courageously. ben-Gurion’s confrontation with his cabi-
net was not easy, and during the deliberations he revealed his anxiety and 
foreboding. The protocols also reflect the unhappy condition of an insecure 
and dependent junior partner about to embark on a roller coaster. If Israel 
declined the French proposal it could have lost the generous support and 
cooperation of the French and the prospects of befriending britain. If it 
joined the French plan it could gravely suffer the injuries of war while alien-
ating the U.S., which most emphatically opposed the idea of war. There 
was also the temptation to seize an opportunity − join the allies and bring 
about a new Middle East order with a weakened Egypt and a stronger Israel. 
The protocols are also a testament to the painful historical experience of 
an eight-year old fledgling polity struggling to develop democratic features 
while experiencing pressures to maintain a centralized style of leadership 
in order to face the threats to its security and survival.4
Israeli constitutionalism places the decision to go to war in the hands 
of the executive branch. However, the nature of the cabinet as a microcosm 
of the majority parties in parliament may provide for a check on the prime 
minister and the military. The power of checks and balances inherent in 
the availability of deliberations is evident is these protocols, and should be 
studied as a model for the Israeli decision-making process activating the 
war-making powers.5
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tHE COMPOSItION OF tHE CAbINEt
On Sunday 28 October 1956, Israel’s cabinet held its regular weekly meet-
ing.6 ben-Gurion placed on the table a motion “to perform an action of 
several raids” the following day.7 Israel’s coalition cabinet comprised 16 
ministers: 9 from the leading Mapai party headed by ben-Gurion; 2 repre-
senting each of the smaller parties—the National religious Party (Mafdal), 
the United Labor Party (Achdut Haavoda), and the Israel Workers Party 
(Mapam); and one representative of the Progressive party, Minister of Jus-
tice Pinhas rosen. Mapai members who participated in the deliberations 
were Ministers Zalman Aranne (Education and Culture); Levi Eshkol 
(Finance); Golda Meir (Foreign Affairs); Pinhas Sapir (Commerce and 
Industry); and bechor Shalom Shetreet (Police). Of these, Eshkol, Sapir, 
and Meir constituted the small inner ring with whom ben-Gurion shared 
power.
The National religious Party was represented by ministers Yosef burg 
(Postal Services), and Moshe Shapira (religion and Welfare). The United 
Labor Party was represented by ministers Moshe Carmel (transportation), 
and Israel bar-Yehuda (Interior). These six, together with Pinhas rosen, 
supported the motion but expressed various degrees of skepticism about its 
wisdom and effectiveness. Mapam, whose members opposed the motion, 
was represented by ministers Mordechai bentov (Development), and Israel 
barzilai, (Health).
Five months prior to these events the cabinet underwent a major 
change. Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett, a strong voice for mul-
tilateralism and diplomacy, was ousted and replaced by Golda Meir, a 
staunch ben-Gurion supporter, which tilted the pendulum in favor of 
belligerency.8 The ministers below will be referred to by name.
The cabinet protocols contain 42 dense pages and appear to be a verba-
tim transcript of the deliberations. Of these, ben-Gurion’s opening remarks 
accounted for 10 pages. His response to the challenges and queries posed 
by the ministers occupied another 6.5 pages. Altogether, his words account 
for one-third of the entire protocol. The cabinet approved the motion, with 
the dissention of the two Mapam members.
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tHE MOtION: “A NUMbEr OF rAIDS” Or A FULL 
FLEDGED WAr: WHAt’S IN tHE tErM? Or:  
WHAt WAS tHE CAbINEt VOtING FOr?
ben-Gurion’s motion did not literally amount to a proposal to launch a war. 
He used the term raid or raids to designate the military action on the table, 
repeating it ten times during his presentation. In describing the anticipated 
action by France and britain he informed the cabinet that they will “bomb” 
. . . Egyptian targets with the purpose of “toppling Nasser”; he later used 
the term “action” to describe the anticipated attacks. ben-Gurion reserved 
the term “war” to describe what the enemy might do: “There is apprehen-
sion . . . that following this raid . . . Jordan or Syria or both will launch a 
war against Israel.”9 Clearly, ben-Gurion was choosing his terms carefully.
The previous week, at the secret Sèvres conference in Paris, where the 
agreement between the allies was signed, the british explicitly stated that 
without an Israeli “act of war” britain would not have the formal reason it 
absolutely needed in order to intervene as planned.10 ben-Gurion under-
stood the dangers lurking in defining the proposed action as war. behind 
the careful terminology lay the emerging body of international law—jus 
ad bellum (justice to war).
These powerful yet still nascent doctrines explicitly prohibited wars 
of aggression and strictly regulated decisions to launch wars.11 Israel was 
a party to the UN charter, which outlawed war except for self-defense or 
pursuant to UNSC (UN Security Council) approval.12 At Sèvres, ben-
Gurion bitterly resented the fact that Israel was designated the role of “the 
aggressor” by France and britain (while they donned the cloak of using 
military measures in order to restore peace), and that performing war as an 
act of aggression (violating jus ad bellum) might result in serious interna-
tional complications.13 His opening remarks were carefully crafted to avoid 
an Israeli admission, even in the sheltered and secluded cabinet room, that 
this was the plan.14 The ministers, however, were ready to engage. They 
understood very well the linguistic (hence, legal) significance of choosing a 
term, and forced ben-Gurion to face the full thrust of his motion.
barzilai opened the deliberations with a blistering critique. He imme-
diately named the “elephant in the room”: on the table was a motion to go 
to war. “This motion [is for] an ‘initiated war or initiated actions’.”15 “We 
shall be the first to shoot. The first act of aggression will be ours”; he added 
that, “we are launching an aggression,”16 “we are the aggressors.” barzilai 
bolstered his argument by contrasting the proposed motion with the 1948 
War of Independence, a war of self-defense, with what it was now preparing 
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for—a war of aggression. He used the term “war” twelve times in his four 
and one-half page presentation. The question of the appropriate term for 
the “motion” was thus on the table.
The remaining ministers wrestled with the problem. Following barzi-
lai, bar-Yehuda began by rejecting the term “initiated war”, but continued 
to emphasize that the cabinet was contemplating a war. rosen followed 
suit, conceding that “we clearly now want an initiated war.”17 bentov 
twice referred to the motion as a decision to launch a “preemptive war”.18 
Levi Eshkol (P.M. during the 1967 war), supporting the motion, tried to 
revert to the earlier terminology: “I suggest that in conversations and with 
regard to the press to beware of the definition initiated war . . . this is an 
act of self defense, we should have no doubt, this is the way it will enter 
history.”19 Speaking after Eshkol, Meir picked up the hint. Addressing the 
motion as a “proposed action”, she compared it to 1948. towards the end 
of the meeting, ben-Gurion no longer repeated the euphemism of “raid”, 
but cautioned care: “I shall not use the term preventive war. We should not 
have such thoughts.”20
Clearly, the cabinet was well aware of the nature of the motion and 
its grave international ramifications, and was willing to confront the harsh 
reality. Even those who urged avoiding the terms initiated or preventive war 
understood that it would likely be interpreted as such, and worried about 
being labeled as aggressors. No one was fooled or blinded as they voted on 
the motion.
tHE StrUCtUrE OF tHE CAbINEt’S DELIbErAtIONS
ben-Gurion opened with a well-structured presentation of the proposal. 
Following his presentation, a group of skeptical ministers spoke. two 
squarely opposed the motion, while others reluctantly supported it—bar-
zilai poignantly expressed dissent while bentov delivered his opposing argu-
ments later. between these two, other ministers offered grave reservations, 
but did not oppose the motion.21
ben-Gurion then launched a discussion (7 pages), interspersed with 
interruptions from the skeptical group, offering rebutting arguments and 
defending the motion. In contrast to his opening remarks, his response to 
the skeptics appeared to be more candid, revealing his anxiety and deep 
doubts. As shall be discussed later, he unmasked a crucial factor in this deal: 
it was an offer he felt he could not and should not refuse. He could not 
refuse the offer because of the three powers, Israel was the vulnerable agent, 
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discreetly obliged to heed the desires of its senior partners; this was true 
particularly with regard to the desire of France, Israel’s generous benefactor. 
He should not refuse the offer because the expected fruit of success—an 
overhaul of the international order in the Middle-East was too promising, 
while the status quo appeared so grim. When ben-Gurion concluded his 
rebuttal the floor was taken by his loyal supporters who favored the motion. 
Unlike the tough arguments presented by the skeptics, the loyalists offered 
perfunctory arguments and were distinguished by what they did not say. 
Even though (or because) this group was made of the top party echelon, 
Israel’s major power holders, who understood what was at stake, they 
limited themselves to platitudes and refrained from engaging the more 
penetrating arguments made by the skeptics. In keeping with ben-Gurion’s 
admonition, the loyalists spoke very briefly, and the motion was approved. 
Following approval, the two dissenters stated that they would remain in 
the cabinet rather than resign, thereby sharing collective responsibility for 
the war.22
CASUS BELLI: WHY WAr? WHY tOMOrrOW?  
tHE PrIME MINIStEr SPEAKS
ben-Gurion’s opening remarks (nearly a quarter of the entire protocols) 
were structured and coherent. He began with a statement of the casus belli, 
followed by a short report of the military plans of attack, the agreement 
between Israel, France, and britain, and finally his concerns. The list of 
casus belli clearly reveals that ben-Gurion was aware of international law 
and implies that jus ad bellum mattered, and that felt obliged Israel to justify 
the appearance of aggression with arguments of self-defense.
The five casus belli against Egypt all constituted violations of interna-
tional law. First, Egypt had violated Section 1 of the armistice agreement 
since its inception. Second, Egypt violated an explicit UNSC resolution of 
1951 which held that “There is no state of war between Egypt and Israel.” 
Third, even if a state of war prevailed, international law gave Israel the 
right of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, which Egypt denied it. 
Fourth, Egypt had organized a special guerilla force, the Fedayeen, and, in 
collaboration with Jordan and Syria, had been responsible for terrorist raids 
committed by this force into Israeli territory.23 Fifth, Egypt’s blockade of 
the Straits of tiran prevented free navigation of ships to the Israeli port of 
Eilat, again in violation of international law. ben-Gurion did not elaborate 
on any of these casus belli. He did not explain how Egypt had violated the 
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UNSC resolution nor distinguish between the offered reasons that did 
constitute a valid ground for a war of self-defense (e.g., the organization of 
the Fedayeen), and those which did not.
ben-Gurion then stated the motion: “There is a proposal to launch a 
few raids,24 the strategic purpose of which is to conquer the coastal strip 
adjacent to the straits of tiran [Aqaba].”25 He elaborated on the nature of 
the straits and the military necessity of establishing control not only over 
the Western coastal strip, but also of strategic points in the Sinai desert 
itself. He described the Egyptian military presence in the Sinai, reminding 
the cabinet that Jordan and Syria were in the process of entering into an 
agreement to unify their military commands under Egyptian leadership. 
He then linked the casus belli to the motion on the table:
The proposal is—for the violations of the armistice agreements, for viola-
tions of international law, for operating the Fedayeen recently and [for] the 
blockade in the Suez and in the Straits of Eilat we shall conduct a raid tomor-
row, the purpose of which is to reach and control the entire coastal strip of 
the straits, including the two small islands that do not have much value but 
particularly the island of tiran.26
The island, he continued, was historically under Jewish sovereignty (in 
the 6th century ce), but, this was not the basis for the motion, which, he 
repeated, was to conduct the “raid tomorrow”.27
He then presented the tripartite agreement between Israel, France, 
and britain:
On tuesday the governments of britain and France will address Israel and 
Egypt and make two pleas: a) to cease the hostilities; b) to refrain from enter-
ing the areas of 10 miles from both sides of the Canal, and c) to allow british 
and French forces to occupy key positions along the Canal. And they will 
request an answer within 12 hours.28
He disclosed the content of the Sèvres agreement: on Wednesday morning 
britain and France would bomb Egyptian air fields and occupy key posi-
tions in the Canal. Furthermore, Egypt’s President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
would be overthrown.29
ben-Gurion discussed the plans’ ramifications for Israel: France was 
explicitly committed to supply air cover for Israel’s back; britain agreed in 
writing not to activate its defense treaty with Jordan if that country used 
the opportunity to attack Israel; and the british commitment gave Israel a 
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free hand to “do whatever we want to do”.30 Addressing the allies’ commit-
ment he stated that he had “no doubts about the sincerity and loyalty” of 
the French; although he was skeptical about britain, during the last week 
he came to trust their commitment to the deal.31
ben-Gurion arrived at the fourth part of the presentation: the pros and 
cons of the proposed war: “It is possible that we shall encounter problems 
with the Egyptian army in the Sinai. We may also face hostilities with 
Jordan and Syria and Iraq.” Nevertheless he urged the cabinet to consider 
the upside:
This is a unique historical opportunity that may never return. Indeed, it is 
impossible to predict, but in the current international constellation there may 
not be another situation where two big powers, not as big as America and 
russia, but big European powers, take it upon themselves to liquidate Nasser 
and they can do it and we shall not be partners to this.32
After an interruption33 ben-Gurion proceeded to emphasize the 
danger posed by Nasser, thereby amplifying the value of the proposed 
regime change: Egypt with a population of 22 million and the charismatic 
Nasser rapidly spreading his influence across the Arab world would sooner 
or later attack Israel, and while this attack would end in Israeli victory, it 
would also be very costly. Joining the allies now would rid Israel of this 
powerful enemy at relatively little cost.34 He also upped the menace: “Not 
only the entire Arab world will assist Nasser, but also someone outside the 
Arab world.”35
ben-Gurion addressed the two superpowers. According to the allies, 
the U.S. was not likely to get involved six days before the presidential 
elections, especially when two of its Western allies were involved. He 
then opined that the USSr would remain neutral if the U.S. did not 
intervene, but added, “Again I say: I do not guarantee this.” Complica-
tions in Eastern Europe might also deter russian intervention. However, 
he cautioned, “russia has enough power to suppress Hungary . . . and to 
interfere here.”36
He reached the need to abide by the rules of parliamentary democracy. 
Like britain and France, Israel needed a formal cabinet ratification before 
action could be taken: “I told them that the cabinet meeting is on Sunday 
morning and only then shall we be able to announce our decision.”37 Why 
tomorrow as opposed to next week or next year?38 ben-Gurion said not a 
word about this matter in his introductory remarks; it was only clarified 
when he re-took the floor to rebut the skeptics.39
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tHE CAbINEt DELIbErAtES
The cabinet deliberations were intense. The skeptical group, both sup-
porters and dissenters, neither adopted the euphemism of “raid” nor were 
swayed by ben-Gurion’s list of casus belli.40 The loyalist group offered tepid 
arguments in favor of the motion. It appeared that even they shared the 
foreboding expressed by the skeptics and dissenters.
The cabinet addressed and evaluated six issues related to the impending 
war: first, the meaning of the tripartite agreement; second, the list of casus 
belli; third, foreseeable international complications, primarily the reac-
tions of the superpowers; fourth, the philosophy of war and peace; fifth, 
the likelihood of regime change in Egypt; and, sixth, the preparedness of 
the home front. The following analysis will weave ben-Gurion’s rebuttal 
into the arguments made by the ministers, but in the original protocols the 
entire rebuttal followed the arguments made by the skeptics.
tHE trIPArtItE AGrEEMENt
As ben-Gurion conceded in his answer to barzilai’s question, but for the 
allies’ intervention he would not have entertained the idea of launching war 
“tomorrow”.41 While ben-Gurion presented the agreement as a unique his-
torical opportunity to improve Israel’s position, barzilai, speaking right after 
ben-Gurion, presented a different appraisal. talking from the standpoint 
of hardnosed realism, he warned of any delusions of friendship. Friendship 
and international relations did not sit well with each other.
britain and France were cynically using Israel, and might not hesi-
tate to drop it in the cold if their interests so dictated. Therefore, barzilai 
warned, it would be reckless for Israel to go along: “For a long time Eng-
land and France have not dared be the first to start [the war], because they 
do not want to invite American pressure, they do not want to appear as 
aggressors before the U.N., what do they do—push us to do it.”42 barzilai 
was alluding to the possibility that international developments, particularly 
U.S. intervention, might lead to a partial satisfaction of britain and France’s 
interests, and that the two might thereby agree to end the hostilities and 
ignore Israel’s interests.
Other ministers also worried about a possible deal between britain, 
France, and Egypt, and raised the specter of perfidious Albion once again 
betraying Israel’s cause.43 Only rosen saw the british involvement as a 
factor in favor of war: “I am doing this (voting yes), because I . . . see this 
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as a shift to a new policy not only regarding France . . . but with regard to 
britain.”44 He confessed that he too suspected british sincerity, yet he came 
to believe that Sèvres represented a turning point in british foreign policy. 
The reason for his enthusiasm, rosen made clear, was the sense of relief 
rooted in the knowledge that Israel was not walking alone.
Unlike rosen, Carmel rejected the alliance, but approved the war. 
Like ben-Gurion, and unlike barzilai, he thought that war was inevitable 
because the siege imposed upon Israel by the Arab countries was intoler-
able. Like barzilai, he insisted on tough realism. War should be fought 
only for the purpose of advancing Israel’s interests, not to do the bids of 
other nations, however friendly they may be. For Carmel, the friendship of 
foreign powers was not a good enough reason to make war, and he warned 
that it might even boomerang because international public opinion may 
come to identify Israel as doing the dirty work for the british.45 Israeli 
independence of action, he emphasized, was crucial.
The second dissenter, bentov, was also underwhelmed by the allure of 
friendship. For him, the devil was in the details. He posed a sharp ques-
tion: an appeal (ultimatum, termed “appeal” out of deference to Israel as 
a partner) by britain and France to Israel and Egypt to cease fire ten miles 
from the canal implied an Israeli plan to reach the Canal. However, ben-
Gurion just stated that Israel was not headed to the Suez Canal and was 
only interested in the Gulf of Aqaba. The appeal therefore was a sham, and 
would only [and in hindsight, indeed did, PL] expose the collusion between 
the three parties.46 bentov wanted to know why they should agree to this 
transparent scheme.
The loyalists, endorsing the tripartite agreement, avoided realpolitik. 
For them the crucial point was that, after eight years of isolated existence, 
Israel was in the company of respectable (European) friends. They urged 
the cabinet to view the agreement as firm and to appreciate the benefits 
of a move that would improve Israel’s international status by creating the 
coveted new Middle East world order. Eshkol referred to the agreement as 
“a complete revolution, a change from one extreme to the other.”47 Meir 
amplified the point: “I am standing in awe; I cannot fathom what hap-
pened there, that suddenly we the meek, the small and humble became a 
focal point” and she added that while she “trusted France it was almost an 
obligation (‘a mitzvah’) to suspect britain.” She also sought to comfort the 
cabinet with a cold calculation—britain would keep its word because it 
“cannot betray us without betraying France”.48 Aranne echoed her descrip-
tion of Israel as the weak party: “If we were strong we would not need the 
alliance, but we are weak.” He also suggested that barzilai’s realism—the 
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suggestion that the allies were using Israel to provide a pretext to go to war, 
should be turned upside down: Israel was the one using the allies in order 
to promote its own interests. The allies’ attack in the Suez Canal would 
cause an upheaval, which in turn would divert attention away from Israel’s 
“raids” and thereby provide it with cover. (“Just so”, ben-Gurion inter-
rupted, confirming the point). Aranne also recommended trust in britain: 
PM Eden’s “personal prestige is hanging on the Suez matter” and therefore 
it is unlikely that he will not follow through.49
Sapir rhapsodized about the relief of associating with such fine com-
pany: “This is a historical opportunity that these mighty wish to go along 
with us.” He reminisced about the dearth of weapons during the war 
of independence compared to the bounty of weapons now supplied by 
France.50 His argument may have been a veiled hint at the fact that the 
cabinet was approving a cold transaction: France was supplying arms and, 
as a quid pro quo, Israel was providing a pretext to launch a war. The cau-
tious Sapir did not offer unequivocal support. He confessed that he had 
“doubts” and was aware of the dangers. There was “anxiety . . . hidden in 
the heart” that the allies might not fulfill their commitment and attack 
on Wednesday.51 He echoed other practical cabinet members who had 
difficulty believing that britain had changed its position overnight.
The cabinet was hard-headed in its appraisal of the Sèvres agreement. 
Almost all ministers understood its overt blessing and its hidden curse. The 
repetition of the sense of relief at having the ring of isolation broken, the 
delight at being recognized as a worthy partner, reveal the anxiety of Israel’s 
elite in the mid-fifties. Isolation was wearing the leadership down, and the 
cabinet welcomed the newfound goodwill; nevertheless, all understood that 
underneath the comforting camaraderie lurked the cruel reality of interna-
tional bargains. First, the newfound british friendship may be short-lived 
and, second, nothing came for free. The condition required to be accepted 
into the halls of the strong and mighty, was to accept the role of aggressor.
This dark side of the bargain was highlighted in ben-Gurion’s rebuttal, 
which on one hand denied the existence of a simple contract—France gave 
Israel weapons “without political conditions”;52 while on the other hand, 
“the initiative (to go to war) did not come from us. If it did not come from 
there [the allies, PL], it would not have come from me, because I wanted 
to get more arms.”53 He conceded that there was an unarticulated expec-
tation that Israel would abide by France’s desire to go to war in order to 
guarantee the flow of arms. That the negotiations were not among equal 
partners, and that Israel, the dependent partner, had limited bargaining 
power, became even clearer when ben-Gurion explained the choice of the 
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date for the invasion (the next day), an explanation he failed to offer during 
his opening remarks. Five times in the space of two pages he repeated that 
“We did not decide upon the date”, that “The date was chosen by them”, 
and Israel could only say “yes or no”.54 From Israel’s perspective, he said, 
waiting another six months would have been preferable, but the matter was 
not in Israel’s hands. “They are not in my pocket”, he said, again referring 
to Israel’s weakness at the bargaining table.55
Commenting on the issue of friendship, ben-Gurion observed that 
Israel stood to gain an enormous amount. Nasser would be overthrown 
(of which he was certain) by the military forces of the two friends, without 
“one Jew’s falling in battle”.56 Therefore, “Isn’t it nice that we perform an act 
the night before that is unconnected with their action . . . they will use it 
as a pretext to issue an ultimatum to Nasser.”57 No one should blame ben-
Gurion for thinking that this was about “being nice”. rather, he offered a 
hard-headed analysis: the tripartite agreement required that Israel appear 
as an aggressor before the international community, and that may be a 
“disaster”; yet at the same time Nasser could be destroyed. On balance, the 
foreseen gain justified the pain.
tHE LISt OF CASUS BELLI
Of the five causes justifying a war listed by ben-Gurion, the denial of 
freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba was the one that most 
of the ministers dwelled upon. by implication, they opined that the four 
other causes failed to qualify as valid reasons to start a war at that time. The 
guarantee of freedom of navigation to and from the port of Eilat, marginal 
from the perspective of britain and France, proved to be the most enduring 
and powerful achievement of Israel in the 1956 war.58
Ministers understood that the blockade needed more in order to qual-
ify as a casus bellum. An actual act of aggression on the part of Egypt was 
needed in order to ripen the blockade into a right of self-defense. They 
called it a reason or ground (in Hebrew “Eela”): Israel should have tried to 
send a ship through the straits. Only when Egypt activated the blockade 
and prevented passage would Israel’s right of self defense spring to life. The 
term “reason” or “ground” was used in two separate contexts throughout the 
deliberations. The allies demanded that Israel go to war, thereby supplying 
them with a reason to intervene without appearing as aggressors. besides 
supplying a ground of action to others, Israel itself needed a reason to start 
a war and show that it was not in flagrant violation of international law. In 
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addition to resenting the need to supply the allies with a ground for action, 
with a keen awareness of international law, some ministers were worried 
about the absence of a justification that might absolve Israel of the charge 
of aggression. Like ben-Gurion, the ministers were sensitive to the ways jus 
ad bellum applied to the case at hand.
ben-Gurion had already introduced the issue in his initial presenta-
tion, but he was referring to navigation through the canal, not the Straits of 
tiran, proving perhaps that the canal was the focus of the war, as required 
by britain and France: “There was a suggestion that maybe we should try 
to send a ship through the Suez Canal and they (the Egyptians) will deny 
it passage. This would be a reason to conduct the raid.” A consultation 
with Carmel, made clear that there was no time to execute the plan and it 
was shelved.59
The ministers made various suggestions for an appropriate “reason” 
to launch a war, thereby implying that ben-Gurion’s five causes were not 
persuasive. Shapira, fearing that Israel might be portrayed as an aggres-
sor, suggested that Israel use the recent establishment of a Unified Arab 
Command under Egyptian leadership as casus bellum. “We should file a 
complaint in the Security Council, claiming that the unified command 
amounted to a declaration of war. That way we shall be justified in taking 
action.”60 bentov rejected this idea, and re-emphasized the Aqaba blockade 
as the only plausible ground to launch war: “We need to do the maximum 
to give the world the impression that this is the reason for the war.” He 
emphasized his frustration at the fact that the Ministry of transporta-
tion failed to arrange for “a ship [that] will break through the blockade 
and that they will detain it, that they will shoot at it.”61 At the end of the 
debate, Eshkol picked up on bentov’s idea, but challenged the argument 
that it would have provided a superior justification: “They [the Egyptians] 
could have let the ship pass, and thereby preempt the reason [to launch a 
war].”62 Eshkol’s argument was pragmatic and impatient of technicalities. 
A “reason” was a cover-up, and not a true cause. because it was likely to 
fail it was useless. The appearance of legality was not material. For Eshkol, 
a staunch ben-Gurion loyalist, the justification to go to war was rooted in 
the “opportunity” the war provided for improving Israel’s circumstances. 
This was both the true and the sufficient reason.63
Overall, it seems that the casus belli were not perceived by the cabinet 
as persuasive or even necessary. There seemed to be a tacit understanding 
that Israel was going to war in order to abide by the tripartite agreement. 
Ministers also understood the significance of jus ad bellum, and most hoped 
a way could be found to present Israel as adhering to the emerging norms 
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of the law of war. At the same time, they were swayed by the benefits a 
successful war might produce for Israel: regime change in Egypt, defeat of 
the Egyptian army in Sinai, acquisition of territory along the coastal strip 
of the Gulf of Aqaba which would guarantee free navigation to Eilat, and 
alliance with the European powers, kindling hopes of acting as “almost” 
equal partners in engineering a new Middle East order.
INtErNAtIONAL COMPLICAtIONS
barzilai, taking the floor after ben-Gurion, interpreted the tripartite agree-
ment in the context of the broader international scene. Why did britain 
and France need Israel? because they worried about U.S. pressure and 
looked for a scapegoat. He warned about the U.S. reaction to the invasion, 
and dismissed as mere speculation ben-Gurion’s assessment that the Presi-
dential election campaign would distract the U.S. barzilai predicted that 
U.S. pressure could yet undo any future military gains opining [correctly, 
in hindsight] that it would use the invasion to augment its international 
role as a “champion of peace”, and make “decisive political moves” against 
Israel.64 U.S. pressure on the European parties could leave Israel in precisely 
the situation it dreaded: alone in the battlefield. Even France, considered 
by ben-Gurion as Israel’s true friend, may change course if the U.S. could 
persuade Nasser to terminate his interventions in Algeria.65
barzilai focused on the USSr. The complications in Hungary and 
Poland were not so great as to rule out Soviet intervention [also correct in 
hindsight]. The USSr had enough resources to intervene both in Eastern 
Europe and in the Middle East. An invasion of the Sinai may even give 
the Soviets the excuse they needed to gain influence in the Middle East.66 
He added that the bandung group of Asian and African nations, which 
recently opposed colonialism and imperialism, would react with hostility 
against Israel.67 bentov also called attention to the U.S.: “After the elec-
tions, the U.S. may, together with other powers, insist that we withdraw, 
this danger is real.”68
ben-Gurion admitted that he too was worried:
Most of all I am worried about America. America will force us to withdraw. 
America does not need to send military forces. America can say that she is 
breaking diplomatic relations, stopping Israeli fund raising, loan guarantees, 
and more, she will consider what’s more important to her—we or the Arabs, 
that we shall be in her camp or that she will be against us.
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He could not predict how Eisenhower, if elected for a second term (very 
likely at that point) would react.69 This analysis, almost an accurate fore-
cast of future events, is astonishing. ben-Gurion and the cabinet had a 
very good grasp of the international scene; they were fully aware of the 
risks, and yet decided to go forward. The proof that the U.S. factor was 
well understood, and only obscured for fear that it would tilt the scale in 
favor of prudence, is found in the analysis of the loyalists, whose discussion 
followed ben-Gurion’s rebuttal. Neither Eshkol, nor Meir, both practical 
leaders intimately familiar with the extent of Israel’s dependence on the 
U.S., mentioned the superpower. Instead, they emphasized the extraordi-
nary fortunes that would befall Israel should the “opportunity” materialize 
into gains. While silent about the U.S., they did discuss the dangers posed 
by the USSr, as if attention to the USSr would spare deliberation about 
the U.S. It may well be that the loyalists accepted the inevitability of “war 
tomorrow”, and therefore concentrated on the promise of the expected 
gains. However, it is important to realize that ben-Gurion disclosed his 
astute estimate of what was to come and that the cabinet understood the 
risks taken.
Meir, whose cabinet role should have required analysis of the inter-
national scene, and who was savvy about international affairs, defended 
the plan in generalities, “the world” would condemn Israel, but “we shall 
overcome”. to justify the war, and strengthen the cabinet in expectation 
of world condemnation, she revived the narrative of the 1948 war. Then, as 
now, Israel had been fighting for survival and had no choice but to weather 
the storm:
I am not ashamed for this to be recorded in the protocol, that if I have to 
choose between these two things [death or survival, PL], I am willing to 
receive a condemnation even from the UN, even from . . . all the heads of 
states, the decent and the indecent and stay alive.70
She understood the impending international outcry and implicitly urged 
the cabinet to accept it with no feelings of guilt.
Sapir further diverted attention away from the U.S. to the USSr: “I 
see the greatest danger in a covert russian intervention against us. russia 
will experience Nasser’s defeat as its own” He added that one could not tell 
how the political chaos in Jordan or the unrest in Syria might affect the 
situation.71 Despite his fears he supported the war. The tactical reasoning by 
the group of loyalists—all well acquainted with the significance of the U.S. 
for Israel’s survival—is an indication of the dynamics of decision making 
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in the cabinet. Whether determined to suppress the reality in order to calm 
their own fears, or aware that the opportunity for reversal was not on the 
table, the loyalists seemed either to have placed support of the prime min-
ister above their keen understanding of Israel’s interests, or to have trusted 
their leader to know better.
A MAttEr OF PrINCIPLE:  
WHEN SHOULD tHE NAtION GO tO WAr?
barzilai first introduced the point: “I must return to . . . principles, you 
[ben-Gurion] have explained it best . . .: a shaky peace is always better 
and preferred to victory in war, not to war, but to a victory in war”. War 
meant loss of life and limb, the sacrifice of “an entire young generation” (as 
experienced in the war of independence, PL) with no guarantee of peace. A 
“third round” between Israel and its neighbors was foreseeable, even if this 
war ended in victory. barzilai reminded ben-Gurion that he himself had 
theorized that only a political solution, not a war, could resolve the Arab 
Israeli conflict, and that in the past he (ben-Gurion) pledged that Israel 
“shall never start a war.”72
barzilai asked ben-Gurion to account for the theory of war and peace 
that he had previously elaborated upon,73 that war was linked to death, that 
a government was bearing the awesome responsibility to preserve the life 
of the young generation.74 He later referred to ben-Gurion’s assertion that 
this war would be short: “Who guarantees that there will not be a confla-
gration . . . even if the chance is small, are we allowed to take the risk?”75 
better keep the shaky peace, he concluded.76 His insights struck a chord 
and ignited a lively debate.
An interesting aspect of the debate was how barzilai’s words were 
twisted. Whereas he stated that “a shaky peace” was better than war, bar-
Yehuda changed the term to “bad peace”, stating that he would not neces-
sarily prefer a bad peace to a war.77 On his mind was the Jewish experience 
in WW II. The bad peace with Nazi Germany “only secured our destruc-
tion”.78 Hence, choosing between war and peace was not a matter of prin-
ciple but rather contingent upon context. Yet bar-Yehuda refrained from 
analyzing the pending circumstances. The matter was already decided: “We 
are not asked to decide prospectively but rather retroactively.”79
The cabinet addressed the desirability of a “bad peace over war”—rather 
than “a shaky peace compared to war”. barzilai, perhaps realizing he was out-
numbered, or losing perspective of the difference in the heat of the debate, 
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did not correct his fellow ministers. Carmel picked up the theme. “I agree 
with the formula that a bad peace is better than victory”, but he pointed 
to exceptions. A bad peace may lead to war under worse circumstances. He 
opined that war in the near future was inevitable because the “belt around 
us is tightening so that the danger for the destruction of the state increases 
daily.” Therefore, it was preferable to launch a war now when the circum-
stances were more favorable. As to victory, Carmel argued that a military 
victory was always better than defeat.80 The task at hand was to prevent 
further changes in the status quo. The Arab countries were tightening the 
siege around Israel and time was on their side. It was better to strike now. 
bentov rejected this view and reintroduced the principle that only political 
solutions were stable: “In general I do not believe that a small nation can 
resolve any problem through war. Every problem resolved will yield graver 
problems.” ben-Gurion interrupted, and the following exchange took place: 
“One problem, God forbid, may be resolved to destroy us”—bentov, “So it 
will resolve the problem of the other side”—ben-Gurion, “We need to make 
sure there will be no such war”—bentov, “This is a long term problem. We 
are now speaking about short term problems.”
The gist of the disagreement between the two was survival. ben-Gurion 
saw every war, even one initiated by Israel, as involving Israel’s survival. 
bentov urged a distinction between different kinds of war, and saw the 
proposed war as related not to survival but rather to benefits that may or 
may not materialize. ben-Gurion agreed that, “We know how we start, but 
there is no guarantee how it will end.”81 He admitted that the territorial 
gains he discussed in his opening remarks might not materialize. He now 
offered a different benefit: the war might bring about a quiet period of 
five to eight years that would enable Israel to invest in domestic building: 
“When I weigh on the one hand the chances of constructive work, and on 
the other hand the possibility of struggle and war, then the quiet work is 
decisive.” He predicted that Nasser’s overthrow would grant Israel a period 
of “passive peace”, a welcome development.82 Eshkol and Meir returned 
to the notion of a “bad peace”. “We are increasingly under siege”, Eshkol 
echoed Carmel’s point, and this could only end in a “bad peace”. He did 
not see a partner with whom to strike a “bad peace” deal. Egypt was plan-
ning to attack Israel, i.e., it had no interest in maintaining the conditions 
of a “bad peace”.83 Meir reiterated Eshkol’s point calling the “bad peace” an 
“unguaranteed luxury”. The Arab countries would destroy the “bad peace” 
at the appropriate moment.
The cabinet deliberations veered between the general and the par-
ticular. The skeptical ministers emphasized the matter of principle—war 
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was risky, unpredictable surprises and complications might arise. Unless 
absolutely necessary, it was preferable to keep the status quo. Even a military 
victory, they emphasized, might not yield the desired political solution. 
ben-Gurion’s loyalists emphasized the logic of preemptive war: a bad peace 
gives the enemy time to prepare for war. ben-Gurion was in the middle, 
conceding the validity of the principle, but pushing for an exception to 
the rule because this war presented an “opportunity” to improve Israel’s 
strategic situation. The meaning of a “shaky peace”, with its implication 
that perhaps diplomacy could lead to a political solution, was frozen in the 
icy realization that war was inevitable. In a collective act of “reducing dis-
sonance”, the cabinet dismissed the faint promise of diplomacy and adopted 
the pessimism inherent in the reality of war.
LIKELIHOOD OF rEGIME CHANGE
ben-Gurion made it clear that overthrowing Nasser was enormously impor-
tant and tempting.84 None of the ministers in the ensuing deliberations 
doubted the dangers inherent in Nasser’s leadership or the legitimacy of 
perpetrating a regime change by external force. Some doubted the likeli-
hood of regime change or expressed fears about the aftermath of such an 
overthrow, even if it came to pass. barzilai argued that “It may well be that 
Nasser will depart”; from his place in exile he “may also establish a shadow 
government, he may launch an unending guerrilla war.” Who could tell 
what policy “his replacement will choose”. Egypt’s next ruler may decide 
to appease the West by displaying cooperation on the Suez Canal issue or 
even on Algeria. While doing so, this next ruler may adopt a harsh position 
against Israel (barzilai referred to an anti-Semitic policy thereby equating 
an anti-Israel position with anti-Semitism). Under these circumstances the 
appeased West may turn its back to Israel.85
ben-Gurion ignored barzilai’s warnings. He twice expressed his “trust” 
that britain and France were determined to remove Nasser, and that they 
had the military power to do so. but he cautioned not to see regime change 
as a fait accomplis: “A different government may emerge in Egypt, I do not 
know, I do not give this as part of the dowry, nobody can tell what will 
happen there.”86 The matter was not extensively deliberated even though it 
was a major aim of the proposed war. It may well be that the ministers had 
too much trust in the “mighty” European powers, and could not fathom 
that the task would not be accomplished. It could also be that wishful 
thinking took hold of them, helping turn a blind eye to barzilai’s warnings 
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and ben-Gurion’s concession. The cabinet could not ponder alternative 
scenarios to the rosy one presented by ben-Gurion.
tHE PrEPArEDNESS OF tHE HOMEFrONt
In his initial presentation, ben-Gurion mentioned that Israel lacked ade-
quate protection against a possible Egyptian air attack, and that France 
had committed its air force to protect the rear should an attack take place. 
barzilai and bar-Yehuda both protested that the homefront was not ade-
quately protected because there were not enough shelters and hospitals. 
ben-Gurion urged the cabinet not to address the matter “now” and the 
matter indeed was dropped until after the vote.
CONCLUSION
This article is one part of an ongoing research project. The emphasis on 
small in the title—a small nation goes to war—should now stand out as an 
important aspect of the decision-making process. In the second half of the 
twentieth century the place a country occupied in the larger international 
scene made a difference. The protocols leading to the fateful decision to 
go to war reveal a sober and earnest process of deliberation, where much 
of the information was placed on the table, and where deep and searching 
arguments were considered. The vulnerability of Israel on the international 
scene appears to have served as the ultimate push to authorize the invasion.
Israel emerged with a few gains from the 1956 war that were not fore-
seen by either ben-Gurion or the cabinet. The gains should be attributed 
to ben-Gurion’s ability to change course in light of the United States’ 
fierce disapproval, and to the fine diplomatic campaign led by Meir and 
Eban, a campaign that galvanized U.S. public opinion in support of the 
small and vulnerable Jewish State. It may well be that without diplomacy, 
international ire might have seriously traumatized the fledgling polity.
It is important to consider not only what was said, but also what was 
omitted. two important issues were not mentioned. First, the fact that at 
the end of the Sèvres meeting the French promised Israel a big reward—
assistance in building a peaceful nuclear plant in the Negev. ben-Gurion did 
not report this to the cabinet. Second, the entire protocols do not mention 
the Egyptian Jewish community. The Jewish state, looking backward at 
the horrific catastrophe of the Holocaust and forward to building a strong, 
80  •  israel studies, volume 15, number 3
defensible Israel, did not pause to consider the fate of Egyptian Jews. They 
were expelled by Nasser shortly after the invasion and thereby came an end 
to the Jewish community in Egypt.
Notes
1. I wish to thank Natan Aridan and David Kretzmer for valuable comments 
and suggestions, Mordechai bar-On and Motti Golani for enlightening discus-
sions, and rivka brot for expert research. The article does not address the intrica-
cies that propelled britain and France to go to war. Suffice it to say that Nasser’s 
nationalization of the Canal in the summer of 1956, coupled with his support for 
the rebellion against the French in Algeria, gave the two European powers enough 
motivation to use force. Simultaneously, France and Israel were intensifying their 
relationship, with France becoming Israel’s major supporter and arms supplier. 
There is voluminous literature on this subject. See, e.g., Motti Golani, Israel in 
Search of a War (brighton, UK, 2007) (Hebrew edition contains two volumes, 
published by Maarachot); Natan Aridan, Britain, Israel and Anglo-Jewry (London, 
2004); Mordechai bar-On, Of All the Kingdoms: Israel’s Relations with the United 
Kingdom During the First Decade after the End of the British Mandate In Palestine, 
1948–1958 ( Jerusalem, 2006) [Hebrew]; S. Ilan troen and Moshe Shemesh eds., The 
Suez-Sinai Crisis: 1956 (London, 1990); Michael brecher, The Foreign Policy System 
of Israel (Oxford, 1972); Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land (Ann Arbor, MI, 
2006); benny Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956 (Tel-Aviv, 2003) [Hebrew]; Avi 
Shlaim, The Iron Wall (New York, 2000); Gabriel Sheffer, “Sharett, ben-Gurion, 
and the 1956 War of Choice,” Medina Umimshal, 5 (1988). There are also several 
memoirs from this period including by David ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, Shimon 
Peres, Abba Eban, and Gideon raphael.
2. E.g., Gad Yaacobi, The Government (tel-Aviv, 1980) 214–6 [Hebrew]. This 
book, typical of the period, states that the motion to launch a war approved a 
fait accomplis but does not mention any cabinet deliberations. Golani methodi-
cally reviews the processes leading to the war but does not refer to any cabinet 
deliberations, presumably because the cabinet protocols were still classified.
3. I wish to thank the team at Israel’s archive for their professional help. The 
protocols are on file in my personal archives. See also State of Israel, Israel State 
Archives, Yemima rosenthal (ed)., Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, 12 
( Jerusalem, 2009) 5. The volume includes rich documentation of the Suez War but 
does not include the protocols documenting the decision to go to war. Hereafter: 
Protocols.
4. The protocols pose the cardinal question of constitutional governance: what 
institutional and procedural method should guide a nation as it contemplates war? 
A Small Nation Goes to War  •  81
This question is intimately linked to the question of the role of law; what, if any, 
role did legal notions and principles play in the deliberations authorizing the war?
5. The Israeli arrangement has followed that of the U.K. Westminster model. 
Prior to the Suez War, the 19 Cabinet members under PM Anthony Eden formed 
an “Egypt Committee”, which ultimately decided to validate the Sèvres agreement 
and go to war. Eden headed the 7 member committee. See Colin Seymour-Ure, 
“british ‘War Cabinets’ in Limited Wars: Korea, Suez and the Falklands,” Public 
Administration, 181 (2007) 62.
6. ben-Gurion returned from Sèvres late on Wednesday 24 October. As minis-
ter of defense he had four days to prepare his military for the attack and to persuade 
his cabinet to vote for launching the war. There is a theory that he preferred to 
wait until the conventional Sunday meeting in order to prevent a leak about the 
top secret impending plan (Yaacobi, The Government 215). It is equally likely that 
no meeting could be fruitfully held prior to Sunday. The Sabbath, beginning on 
Friday afternoon, practically precluded the participation of the members of the 
religious party and, more importantly, ben-Gurion knew well that his cabinet 
was skeptical of the idea of war and needed time to secure an affirmative vote. 
During the deliberations he referred to the wrenching discussions with individual 
ministers. It is also possible that he calculated that the cabinet, facing the decision 
to “go to war tomorrow” would bend to pressure to approve the motion so as not 
to upset britain and France, who presumably relied on Israel and made their own 
preparations for the invasion.
7. The Hebrew original, “there is a motion to conduct an action of several 
raids”, is grammatically awkward in as much as ben-Gurion implicitly concedes 
that this is an action which, in fact, comprehends several actions, and that the des-
ignation “action” in the singular is designed to mask the breadth of the proposed 
activity. The date was dictated by britain and France, and appears to have been 
reluctantly accepted by ben-Gurion.
8. See, e.g., Eyal Kafkafi, The Sinai Campaign—A Diplomatic History (tel-Aviv, 
1994) [Hebrew]; Morris, Israel’s Border Wars 255–66; Gabriel Sheffer, Moshe Sharett, 
Biography of a Political Moderate (Oxford, 1996); Resolution versus Management of 
the Middle Eastern Conflict: Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion ( Jerusalem, 1980).
9. The concern was rooted in the existence of a mutual defense treaty between 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Particularly worrisome was the defense treaty between 
Jordan and britain, which would have required britain to intervene in a case of 
war between Jordan and Israel. ben-Gurion reported that britain guaranteed that 
it would not intervene if “Jordan attacked Israel”. These remarks clearly suggest 
that he was well aware of the differences between preemptive, preventive, and 
defensive war. Later ben-Gurion described the “apprehended” Jordanian reac-
tion as a “sudden attack”, and explained the security measures taken to address it. 
Protocols, 5.
10. Mordechai bar-On, Challenge and Quarrel: The Road to Sinai—1956 (Sede-
boker, 1991) 259 [Hebrew]. From the perspective of international law there is no 
82  •  israel studies, volume 15, number 3
difference between a war and a “raid”—both are forbidden subject to the exceptions 
delineated in the UN Charter (below, n. 11). However, the policy of Israel’s govern-
ment was to conduct “raids” or limited combat operations, justifying them as acts 
of “self-defense”. When ben-Gurion used the term “raid” rather than war here he 
was both referring to a practice that has become expected, if not condoned by the 
international community, and even wrapping it in the rationale of self-defense 
associated with legitimacy in the Israeli mind. For the history of raids in the years 
following Israeli independence see Morris, Israel’s Border Wars.
11. “The United Nations Charter generally prohibits the use of force (Article 
2(4)) with two exceptions: force may be used by states acting in individual and 
collective self-defense (Article 51) and force may be used when authorized by the 
Security Council (Article 39, 42).” Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and 
the Use of Force, Cases and Materials (New York, 2005) 240.
12. Idem.
13. bar-On, Challenge and Quarrel 259–61, Golani, Israel in Search of a War 
364–74.
14. Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan came up with the idea that Israel would launch 
a deep and powerful raid that would have enough attributes of war to satisfy the 
british demand while allowing Israel to claim that it was merely continuing its 
previous policy of conducting occasional raids across its borders. This verbal solu-
tion also explains the dubious grammar in “an action of several raids”, infra n. 20. 







21. I refer to these ministers as “The skeptical group”. They included barzilai, 
bentov, bar-Yehuda, rosen, Shapira, and Carmel (in order of appearance).
22. Protocols, 41. ben-Gurion: “. . . what does it mean that you are opposed, 
are you staying in the government and accepting responsibility?” barzilai: “I wish 
this issue to be stated without doubt, that we see ourselves as responsible out of 
cooperation and collegiality one hundred percent. We expressed our opinion, voted 
in accordance with our judgment and conscience, we think that this is a grave 
matter, but we shall carry the burden of responsibility.”
23. The word terrorist did not appear in the protocols.
24. The literal translation is “an action of several raids”—“peulat pshitot 
achadot”, Protocols 1. See Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, for a discussion of the role 
of “raids” in Israeli military and foreign policy during the 1950s.
25. Protocols, 1: “There is a proposal to launch an action of several raids, the 
strategic purpose of which would be the conquest of the coastal strip of the straits 
A Small Nation Goes to War  •  83
of the Sea of reeds, seizing the forts on along the coast, I shall tell you which are 
the forts—”
26. Protocols, 3.
27. Idem. true to the Zionist narrative of “return” to the land of the forefathers, 
ben-Gurion could not resist recounting the historical claim to the islands.
28. In the general literature this “appeal” is known as the “ultimatum”, but at 
Sèvres the decision was to refer to it as “an appeal” out of respect towards Israel, 
which was placed in the paradoxical situation of being both a partner to the 




32. Ibid., 7 “There was a proposal to make us partners but we refused.”
33. Idem. rosen: “Why do you say that we shall not be partners in liquidating 
Nasser?” ben-Gurion: “because they will do so by themselves.”
34. Ibid., 7.
35. Ibid., 8.
36. Idem. ben-Gurion estimated that “The Soviets were speculating that they 
will complete their interventions in Eastern Europe before the elections in the U.S.”
37. He ended his speech by raising concerns about the possibility that Jordan 
would attack on tuesday and that the Jordanian border with Israel was long, and 
discussed precautionary measures, Protocols, 9.
38. In this rebuttal, ben-Gurion emphasized several times that he would have 
preferred to wait another six months. Mordechai bar-On, who was present at 
Sèvres, recounts that ben-Gurion pleaded for one more day “to leave us four days 
of preparations”, but the French rejected his request emphatically; Challenge and 
Quarrel 276.
39. See discussion below.
40. Carmel, Protocols. 22. “We need to act in order to prevent a change in the 
status quo against us . . . but . . . I would not want the world to get the impression 
that we initiated this.”
41. Barzilai, Protocols, 13, “There are a  lot of urgent matters pressing us  .  .  . 
between us, if this lucky occurrence [the agreement, PL] would not have emerged, 





a member of the St. Germain delegation, which first explored the possibility of a 












do you think that they are in my pocket?”
56. ben-Gurion repeated this twice (Protocols, 29), implying that the work will 
be done by others. Evidently by “Jew” he meant Israeli, as it was quite possible that 
the british and French troops included Jews. See also below—the fate of Egyptian 
Jews was not mentioned.
57. Protocols, 29.
58. However, Nasser persisted in refusing to recognize Israel’s right (even though 
he did not interfere with actual navigation after May 1957). His blockade of the 
straits in 1967 led to the Six Day War. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land 80–2.
59. Protocols, 8.
60. Ibid., 21: “The world should know that we see the unified command now 
as a threat to our . . . life.”
61. bentov thought the Unified Arab Command could not provide adequate 
grounds for attack, because the Command did not issue any threat to Israel. He 
offered no details, but it appears he was talking about breaking the blockade of the 
straits of Aqaba, not the refusal of passage through the Suez Canal, Protocols, 24.
62. A curious exchange between Eshkol and bentov proved that Eshkol did not 
study the matter of such a ground for attack before the cabinet meeting: Eshkol: 
“but even if there were ship—a strange thing might have happened, in the past 
they already permitted a ship to pass (bentov: “Not under Israel’s flag.”)—I think 
it has happened once. It would have been best if they did something last night.” It 
was not clear what he was referring to, Protocols, 34.
63. Unlike other fellow ministers, the loyalist Eshkol searched for legal 
justifications to validate the action.
64. Protocols, 12. barzilai added, “What will the Democrats say during the 
campaign: you [Eisenhower, PL] bragged that you are putting off a great fire, before 
the elections, under your nose they are arranging a big conflagration.”
65. Idem.
66. Idem. “When we start an aggressive act, a good opportunity is created for the 
Soviets to intervene . . . if America does not want and cannot enter into a conflict 
with Israel, it will make it easier for russia to intervene here.”
67. Ibid., 14.
68. bentov did not speak in full sentences but in fragmented remarks. His literal 
words were: “I fear that matters will look differently after the elections in America. 
They will reach an agreement with Egypt. I do not know what problems might 
A Small Nation Goes to War  •  85
arise, India, or oil or something else. Shall we not confront a situation that these 
superpowers together with others will demand our withdrawal? I am talking about 
a real danger.” Protocols, 26.
69. Protocols, 32.
70. Golda Meir, born in russia but raised in the US, prized America and 
was a great believer in Israel’s need to cultivate good relations with the Western 
superpower. At the St. Germain meeting, which preceded the Sèvres conference, 
she emphasized the importance of not working behind the Americans’ back. Her 
silence in this matter reflects her loyalty to ben-Gurion. She decided to take the 
risk, subordinating her better judgment to his.
71. Protocols, 37–8. Meir also mentioned the USSR, emphasizing its double 
standards. “It may, indeed, come to Egypt’s help, but it would not assist Israel if 
Egypt were the aggressor.” Protocols, 35.
72. Protocols, 13.
73. Stung, ben-Gurion interrupted barzilai: “Wait a minute. You may know 
that I offered conquest of the straits and my offer was rejected, this could have also 
led to war.” barzilai: “Allow me to say this and you know it: in any event this would 
have been a dangerous raid and I think it is good we did not do it.” ben-Gurion: 
“This is subject to different views,” Protocols, 13. The previous year, a proposal by 
ben-Gurion to conquer the straits was rejected by the cabinet, Golani, Israel in 
Search of a War 98–100.
74. barzilai may have been alluding to the 1948 war where approximately 
6,000 men and women died in battle, one percent of Israel’s youth had lost 
their lives. retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/
Israel+wars/Israels+War+of+Independence+-+1947+-+1949.htm [last visited on 
15.2.2010]. Compare to the bloodiest war fought by the U.S.A., the civil war, 
where 2% of the population at the time died in battle.
75. Protocols, 14.
76. Ibid., 13.
77. Ibid., 15. There is a Hebrew play on words here that is hard to capture in 
translation. barzilai’s term was “shalom ra-oo-a,” A shaky peace. bar-Yehuda short-
ened the terms “shaky”—“ra-oo-a”—to “bad” “ra”, thus referring to a condition of 
“shalom ra” bad peace.
78. Idem.
79. Ibid., 16. bar-Yehuda also added that he agreed with many of barzilai’s 
arguments and found them compelling.
80. Ibid., 24.
81. Ibid., 31.
82. It was not clear whether ben-Gurion had in mind the categories of shaky 
vs. bad peace in this context, Protocols, 32.
83. Ibid., 34. “In recent weeks there is always a feeling that we are surrounded, 
this is a basis for a bad peace . . . if Egypt will occupy Jordan the world will see . . . 
what our life amounts to.”
86  •  israel studies, volume 15, number 3
84. Ibid., 4. “The target is to terminate Nasser’s rule.” Protocols, 8: “If we don’t, 
we shall sooner or later confront Nasser, but under totally different conditions, 
isolated, whereas behind him stands the entire Arab world and also some beyond 
the Arab world.”
85. Ibid., 13. Barzilai continued, “Under such circumstances I am not so sure 
that Dulles will repeat his compromising offers to us, he will have the advantage 
of criticizing us as aggressors. In any event he will have a condemning argument.”
86. Ibid., 31, 32.
